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Epistemic Effects of Scientific Interaction: 
Approaching the Question with an  
Argumentative Agent-Based Model 
AnneMarie Borg, Daniel Frey, Dunja Šešelja  
& Christian Straßer ∗ 
Abstract: »Epistemische Auswirkungen wissenschaftlicher Interaktion: Ein ar-
gumentatives agentenbasiertes Modell«. The question whether increased inter-
action among scientists is beneficial or harmful for their efficiency in acquiring 
knowledge has in recent years been tackled by means of agent-based models 
(ABMs) (e.g. Zollman 2007, 2010; Grim 2009; Grim et al. 2013). Nevertheless, 
the relevance of some of these results for actual scientific practice has been 
questioned in view of specific parameter choices used in the simulations 
(Rosenstock et al. 2016). In this paper we present a novel ABM that aims at 
tackling the same question, while representing scientific interaction in terms of 
argumentative exchange. In this way we examine the robustness of previously 
obtained results under different modeling choices.  
Keywords: Agent-based models, abstract argumentation, scientific inquiry, sci-
entific interaction, social networks. 
1.  Introduction1 
Recent investigations of social aspects of scientific inquiry have increasingly 
utilized agent-based models (ABMs) (e.g. Zollman 2007, 2010; Weisberg and 
Muldoon 2009; Douven 2010; Thoma 2015, etc). Computer models are benefi-
cial for the tackling of several questions in the domain of methodology of sci-
ence and social epistemology that are difficult to approach with qualitative 
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methods, such as historical case studies. One such question concerns the impact 
of different degrees and structures of information flow among scientists on 
their efficiency in acquiring knowledge. Zollman’s pioneering work in this 
domain (Zollman 2007, 2010) suggested that information flow within highly 
connected social networks may be epistemically harmful, and that there is a 
trade-off between the success of agents and the amount of time they need to 
reach a consensus (namely, less connected networks need more time to con-
verge but therefore they converge more often to the best hypothesis [Zollman 
2007]). Even though Rosenstock, O’Connor, and Bruner (2016) have shown 
that the results of Zollman’s models do not hold for a large portion of the rele-
vant parameter space, other, structurally different ABMs have come to similar 
conclusions as Zollman (e.g. Grim 2009; Grim et al. 2013). As a result, wheth-
er the results of Zollman’s and Grim’s models can be considered informative of 
actual scientific inquiry has remained an open question. On the one hand, these 
findings could turn out to be a robust property, which can be shown by means 
of a range of models that employ different idealizations (Weisberg 2006). On 
the other hand, the findings could also turn out to be a feature resulting primari-
ly from idealizations employed in these models, and unlikely to hold for actual 
scientific inquiry.  
Of special interest are those idealizing assumptions related to the link be-
tween the information flow among scientists and their efficiency. One such 
idealization concerns the fact that interaction among scientists is usually repre-
sented as an update that does not take into account important contextual fac-
tors, which should further qualify the received information. For example, upon 
receiving information critical of her theory, an agent’s evaluation of the latter 
may remain unaffected if she already has a counterargument (e.g., concerning 
the reliability of the given information). This is not only absent from Zollman’s 
and Grim’s models, but from other ABMs of scientific inquiry as well. While 
some authors have tried to relax this idealization by representing agents as 
“trusting” others only if they have sufficiently similar views (e.g. Hegselmann 
and Krause 2005), by introducing “noise” in the received information (Douven 
2010), by assigning different weights to the opinions of agents (Riegler and 
Douven 2009), or by assigning different epistemic systems to agents 
(De Langhe 2013), these adjustments do not capture the argumentative nature 
of scientific interaction, such as the above mentioned assessment of an argu-
ment in view of possible counterarguments. 
This points to another possibly problematic idealization frequently present 
in ABMs, which concerns heuristic behavior of scientists in face of argumenta-
tive attacks. While in ABMs such as Zollman’s scientists always gather the 
evidence for the given theory in the same manner, it is important to distinguish 
between the heuristic behavior that aims at gathering new evidence and the one 
that aims at finding solutions to the encountered problems. In particular, when 
scientists face possible anomalies in their research programs, such anomalies 
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trigger a search for counterarguments that could turn apparent refutations into 
confirmatory instances (Lakatos 1978). This is important in prohibiting a 
premature abandonment of an actually fruitful inquiry (Nickles 2006; Šešelja 
et al. 2012). 
In this paper we offer a novel approach to the agent-based modeling of sci-
entific inquiry and scientific interaction, which is based on argumentation, and 
which aims to soften the above mentioned idealizations. In this way we will 
examine the robustness of the results obtained by previous ABMs of scientific 
interaction, under different assumptions underlying the simulations. In contrast 
to most other ABMs of science, our model is based on the idea that an essential 
component of scientific inquiry is argumentative dynamics between scientists. 
To this end, we employ abstract argumentation frameworks as one of the de-
sign features of our ABM. Abstract argumentation has previously been shown 
fruitful for the modeling of scientific debates by Šešelja and Straßer (2013) and 
employed in an ABM of social behavior by Gabbriellini and Torroni (2014). 
We will show that this feature makes our model a fruitful tool for tackling 
various questions concerning social aspects of scientific inquiry, including the 
epistemic benefits of scientific interaction. 
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the idea under-
lying our ABM and its main features. In Section 3 we present the central find-
ings of the presented version of our model. In Section 4 we compare our find-
ings with those obtained by other ABMs of science and discuss idealizations 
present in our current model, which should be taken into consideration when 
assessing the relevance of our results for the actual scientific practice. In Sec-
tion 5 we present ideas for further enhancements of this ABM. 
2. The Model 
The aim of our ABM is to represent scientists engaged in a scientific inquiry 
with the goal of finding the best of the given rivaling theories, where they 
occasionally exchange arguments with other scientists, pro or con the given 
pursued theories. The model is used to tackle the question which structure of 
the information flow leads scientists to most efficiently discover the best theo-
ry, where efficiency is measured in terms of their success and the time they 
need to complete their exploration. In this section we will explain the central 
elements of our model, namely, the landscape which agents explore, the behav-
ior of agents, and the notion of social networks employed in our simulations.2 
                                                             
2  Our ABM is created in NetLogo (Wilensky 1999). The source code is available at 
 <https://github.com/g4v4g4i/ArgABM/tree/HSR-Special-Issue-Agent-Based-Modelling> 
(Accessed January 31, 2018). 
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2.1  The Landscape 
Agents, representing scientists, move along an argumentative landscape. The 
argumentative landscape, which represents rivaling theories in a given scien-
tific domain, is based on a dynamic abstract argumentation framework. Let us 
explain what ‘abstract’ and ‘dynamic’ mean here. 
An abstract argumentation framework, introduced by Dung (1995), is a pair 
consisting of a set of abstract entities A representing arguments and an attack 
relation  over A. Similarly, the framework underlying our model consists of a 
set of arguments and an attack relation over this set. In addition to attacking 
each other, arguments may also be connected by a discovery relation . The 
latter represents the path which scientists have to take in order to discover 
different parts of the given theory, i.e., some argument b in the given theory can 
only be discovered after an argument a has been discovered for which a ↪ b.3 
A scientific theory is represented as a conflict-free set of arguments (i.e. no 
argument in the theory attacks an argument in the same theory), connected by 
discovery relations, resulting in a tree-like graph. Formally, an argumentative 
landscape is given by a triple 〈ܣ, , 	〉where ܣ = ۦܣଵ, … ,ܣ௠ۧ is partitioned in 
m many theories ௜ܶ = 〈ܣ௜, ܽ௜, 〉 which are trees with ܽ௜ ∈ 	ܣ௜ as a root and  
  
 
Specifying  like this ensures that the theories are conflict-free. 
The abstractness of the framework concerns all of its elements. Instead of 
providing the concrete content and structure of the given arguments, we repre-
sent them as abstract entities. Similarly, we do not reveal the concrete nature of 
the attack or the discovery relation. 
The framework is dynamic in the sense that agents gradually discover argu-
ments, as well as attack and discovery relations between them. Given the ab-
stract nature of arguments, we interpret them as hypotheses which scientists 
investigate. Occasionally scientists encounter defeating evidence, represented 
by attacks from other arguments, and then attempt to find defending arguments 
for the attacked hypothesis a (i.e., to find arguments in the same theory attack-
ing arguments from other theories that attack a). This dynamic aspect is im-
plemented by associating arguments with their degree of exploration for an 
agent at a given time point of a run of the simulation: for each agent ag and 
each argument ܽ ∈ ܣ, ݁ݔ݌݈(ܽ, ܽ݃) ∈ ሼ0, … ,6ሽ where 0 indicates that the argu-
ment is unknown to ag and 6 indicates that the argument is fully explored and 
                                                             
3 While the process of discovery is generally governed by this rule, there are some exceptions 
to it, which occur as a result of the communication between agents (see below Section 2.3). 
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cannot be further explored.4 In view of this agents have subjective and limited 
insights into the structure of the landscape. Whether an attack or discovery 
relation between two arguments a and a’ is visible to an agent ag depends on 
the degree of exploration expl(a,ag): the higher expl(a,ag) is, the more rela-
tion[s] between a and other arguments will be visible (additionally agents may 
learn about the landscape by communicating with other agents, see Section 2.3). 
2.2  Basic Behavior of Agents 
The model is round-based and each round agents perform actions that are 
among the following: 
(A1) exploring a single argument, thereby gradually discovering possible at-
tacks (on it, and from it to arguments that belong to other theories) as well 
as discovery relations to neighboring arguments;  
(A2) moving to a neighboring argument along the discovery relation within 
the same theory;  
(A3) moving to an argument of a rivaling theory.  
While agents start the run of the simulation at the root of a given theory, they 
will gradually discover more and more of the argumentative landscape. This 
way each turn an agent operates on her own (subjective) fragment of the land-
scape, which consists of her discovered arguments which are explored by her to 
a specific degree, and her discovered (attack and discovery) relations between 
the arguments. 
In order to decide whether to work on the current theory (A1 and A2 above), 
or whether to better start working on an alternative theory (A3) agents are 
equipped with the ability to evaluate theories. Every few rounds agents apply 
an evaluative procedure, with respect to the set of arguments and attacks they 
currently know (i.e. their subjective memory), in order to determine the current 
subjective degree of defensibility of each of the theories. The degree of defen-
sibility of a theory is the number of defended arguments in this theory, where – 
informally speaking – an argument a is defended in the theory if it is not at-
tacked or if each attacker b from another theory is itself attacked by some de-
fended argument c in the current theory. 
We give a more precise formal definition. We say that a subset of arguments 
A of a given theory T is admissible if for each attacker b of some a in A there is 
an a’ in A that attacks b (a’ is said to defend a from the attack by b). Since 
every theory is conflict-free (there are no a and b in T such that a attacks b), it 
can easily be seen that for each theory T there is a unique maximally admissible 
                                                             
4 Our model is round-based (more on that in Section 2.2). Each round may be interpreted as 
one research day. Each of the 6 levels of an argument takes a researcher 5 rounds/days of 
exploration. Thus, each argument represents a hypothesis that needs altogether 30 research 
days to be fully investigated. 
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subset of T (with respect to set inclusion). An argument a in T is said to be 
defended in T if it is a member of this maximally admissible subset of T.5 The 
degree of defensibility of T is equal to the number of defended arguments in T. 
Figure 1: Argumentation Framework 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Argumentation Framework 2 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 depicts a situation with three theories as it might occur from the per-
spective of a given agent: T1 consisting of arguments e and f (white nodes), T2 
consisting of arguments a, b, and g (gray nodes), and T3 consisting of argu-
ments c and d (dark gray nodes). The arrows represent attacks, we omit discov-
ery relations. We are now interested in the degrees of defensibility our agent 
would ascribe to the given theories. The table shows which arguments are 
defended in each theory and their corresponding degree of defensibility. The 
only defended argument in this situation is f in T1. Note for instance that in T3 
the argument d is not defended since no argument in T3 is able to defend it from 
the attack by b. Although the argument f in T1 attacks b, it doesn’t count as a 
                                                             
5 Since theories are conflict-free, our notion of admissibility comes down to the same as the 
one introduced in Dung (1995). In the terminology of Dung (1995) our sets of defended ar-
guments correspond to Dung’s preferred extension (which are exactly the maximally admis-
sible sets) with the difference that we determine these sets relative to given theories. 
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defender of d for theory T3 when determining the defended arguments in T3 
since in our account a theory is supposed to defend itself. 
Figure 2 depicts the situation after an attack from a to f has been discovered. 
Consider theory T2. In this situation a defends b from the attack by f, b defends 
a from the attack by d, a defends g from the attack by e and g defends a from 
the attack by c. Hence, all arguments are defended resulting in a degree of 
defensibility of 3.  
Agents decide to move to a rivaling theory if the degree of defensibility of 
their current theory is below a relative threshold compared to the theory with 
the highest degree of defensibility, i.e., the theory with the most defended ar-
guments.6 
To make a decision between options A1 and A2, each agent employs the 
following heuristic: every time step she considers all arguments in her direct 
neighborhood (relative to the discovery relation) that could possibly be the next 
ones to work on. With a certain probability (determined in the interface of the 
model) she will then move to one of these arguments, or alternatively keep on 
exploring her current argument. In case the argument she is currently at is fully 
explored, she will try to move on to a neighboring argument, and if such an 
argument isn’t visible (e.g., if she has reached the end of a branch of her theo-
ry) she will try to move to the parent argument, or in case it is fully explored, 
she will move to another not fully explored argument in the same theory. 
The decision making of agents also includes some prospective considera-
tions. If during her exploration an agent discovers an attack on the argument a 
she is currently investigating, she will attempt to discover a defense for it. A 
defending argument may be found among the visible neighboring arguments of 
a (relative to the discovery relation). In case a is attacked by an argument b, an 
agent ag working on a will ‘see’ outgoing attack arrows a’  b from an al-
ready discovered child argument a’ of a, even in cases where a’  b is not yet 
discovered by ag since a’ is insufficiently explored by ag.7 This way our agent 
knows that exploring a’ may help in defending a. If no potential defender of a 
is visible she keeps on exploring a in the hope of discovering new neighbors 
and thus new potential defenders. 
This idea corresponds to the situation in which a scientist discovers a prob-
lem in her hypothesis and attempts to find a way to resolve it. While she may 
not have a solution ready at hand, she may have a method for finding such a 
                                                             
6 The relative threshold can be selected in the interface of the model under strategy threshold 
and it allows for theories with similar degrees of defensibility to be considered as equally 
good. In addition, agents have a degree of ‘inertia’ which can be selected in the interface 
under jump threshold. Where n is the jump threshold, an agent can remain for the duration 
of n evaluations on a theory which is not one of the subjectively best ones. 
7 In such cases, where an attack relation is merely ‘seen’ but not yet discovered by an agent, it 
is not yet considered as a defense when the respective theory is evaluated by the agent. 
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solution (for example, going back to the laboratory and conducting some new 
experiments).8 
2.3  Social Networks 
An agent discovers the argumentative landscape by investigating arguments (as 
described in Section 2.2) or by means of exchanging information about the 
landscape with other agents. We will now describe the latter aspect. As men-
tioned above, the presented version of the model is designed to investigate how 
different social networks impact the efficiency of scientists in discovering the 
best theory. In contrast to other ABMs employing the idea of social networks 
(e.g. Zollman 2007, 2010; Grim 2009), which represent connectivity only in 
view of different types of graphs that connect agents, we distinguish between 
two types of social networks. First, our agents are divided into collaborative 
networks which consist of up to five individuals who start from the same theo-
ry.9 While each agent gathers information (i.e. the attack and discovery rela-
tions between arguments) on her own, every five steps this information is 
shared with all other agents forming the same collaborative network. 
Second, besides sharing information with agents from the same network, 
every five steps each agent shares information with agents from other collabo-
rative networks with a given probability of information sharing that is deter-
mined before the run of the simulation.10 This way the agents form ad-hoc and 
random communal networks with agents from other research collaborations. A 
higher probability of information sharing leads to a higher degree of interaction 
among agents. Finally, we represent reliable and deceptive scientists by allow-
ing for different approaches to the sharing of information between networks. A 
reliable agent shares all the information she has gathered during her exploration 
of the current theory, while a deceptive agent does not share information re-
garding discovered attacks on her current theory. This corresponds to the idea 
that deception consists in providing some while withholding other information, 
thus leading the receiver to a wrong inference (Caminada 2009). 
Agents share information either in a unidirectional (an agent sends infor-
mation to another agent) or a bidirectional way (two agents exchange infor-
                                                             
8 Such a heuristic response to apparent refutations belongs to what Lakatos has dubbed the 
negative heuristics of a research program (Lakatos 1978). 
9 Our model allows for collaborative groups also to be formed of agents that are positioned 
on different theories. While in this paper we have focused on the former type, examining 
the behavior of the latter remains for future research. 
10 While agents share their full subjective knowledge within their respective collaborative 
networks, the information which they share with agents from other networks concerns re-
cently obtained knowledge on the theory (arguments and attacks in an agent’s current 
neighborhood) which they are currently exploring. This corresponds to a situation in which 
a scientist writes a paper or gives a talk that presents arguments for and/or against hypoth-
eses regarding the theory she is currently pursuing. 
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mation both ways). Moreover, our model takes into account the fact that receiv-
ing information is time costly: when an agent receives information, she will not 
explore the argument on which she is standing nor move. This corresponds to 
the idea that scientists need to invest time when reading papers by other scien-
tists, which they would otherwise devote to their own research. 
In order to get a better picture of the information flow represented in our 
model and to better understand how costly sharing information is, let’s recall 
the interpretation (see Footnote 4) according to which each round stands for 
one research day, so that five rounds represent one research week. Our agents 
then represent scientists who each Friday first evaluate all the available theories 
in order to decide which one to pursue. Then from next Monday to Thursday 
they engage in the pursuit of their chosen theory. On Fridays, however, before 
performing the assessment of theories, there is a chance that they share infor-
mation with scientists from other collaborative groups. In case a scientist in-
deed receives information from another scientist, she skips pursuing her current 
theory on this Friday (suppose she is at a workshop or she has to review a pa-
per). For example, if the probability of information sharing is set to 0.3, then 
each Friday there is a 30% chance for each of our scientists to interact with a 
scientist from another group. If the probability of information sharing is set to 
the maximum (i.e. to 1), then every Friday each of our scientists will necessari-
ly share information with a scientist from another group, that is, Friday will be 
a “communication day” for everyone. 
3.  The Main Findings 
In this section we will first specify the parameters used in the simulations and 
then present our main results. 
3.1  Parameters Used in Simulations 
We have run the simulation 10,000 times with 10, 20, 30, 40, 70, and 100 
agents by varying the following settings:  
1) different probabilities of an agent communicating with agents from other 
collaborative networks, namely: 0.3, 0.5, and 1;  
2) different approaches to communicating, namely: reliable and deceptive 
agents;  
3) two different landscapes (A and B), both representing three theories (T1 – 
T3), where T1 in both cases has the maximum degree of defensibility (i.e. all 
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of its 85 arguments are fully defensible), while T2 and T3 have different de-
grees of defensibility (Figure 3).11  
Figure 3: Defensibility on Different Landscapes 
 
Tukey boxplot for 1000 data points each: the bottom and top of the box are the first and third 
quartiles, and the band inside the box is the median. Whiskers extend to the most distant value 
within 1.5 IQR from each end of the box and outliers are shown as light-gray dots. 
 
On the one hand, landscape A represents a situation in which T2 and T3 are 
clearly worse than T1 while not being completely problematic (as it would, for 
instance, be the case with pseudo-scientific theories). Hence, in both theories 
approximately half of their arguments are defensible in the objective landscape 
in the majority of setups (Figure 3). On the other hand, landscape B represents 
a situation in which T2 is clearly worse than the other two theories, while T3 has 
a degree of defensibility closer to the fully defensible T1. For example, T2 cor-
                                                             
11 Theories are modelled as trees of depth 3, where each argument (except for the leaves) has 
4 child-arguments, amounting to altogether 85 arguments. Here is a list of other parame-
ters and a short explanation. The move probability is set to 0.5. Together with the degree of 
exploration of the argument an agent is situated at, it determines for each agent the 
chance of moving to another argument. The visibility probability concerns the probability 
with which a new attack relation is discovered when an agent further explores her current 
argument. It is set to 0.5. The research speed determines the number of time steps an agent 
has to work on an argument before that argument reaches its next level of exploration. It is 
set to 5. The strategy threshold is set to 0.9. It expresses that each theory with a degree of 
defensibility that is at least 90% of the degree of defensibility of the best theory is consid-
ered good enough to work on by our agents. The jump threshold has been explained in 
footnote 6 and it is set to 10. 
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responds to a theory that doesn’t have many successful hypotheses (e.g. they 
fail at offering successful explanations of the relevant phenomena), and whose 
arguments are thus very much attacked.12 In contrast, T3 stands for a theory that 
can explain many phenomena, but still less than T1. 
The program runs until one of the theories is completely explored. At that 
point all the agents have one more chance to make their final evaluation and 
choose their preferred theory. As mentioned above, our main research question 
is how efficient agents are in each of the above listed scenarios, where efficien-
cy is assessed in terms of the success of agents in acquiring knowledge, as well 
as in terms of the time steps needed for the run to be completed. 
We have examined this question with respect to two criteria of success: 
- monist criterion, according to which a run is considered successful if, at 
the end of the run, all agents have converged onto the objectively best 
theory;  
- pluralist criterion, according to which a run is considered successful if, at 
the end of the run, there is no theory for which the number of agents 
working on it is greater than the number of agents working on the objec-
tively best theory.  
The monist criterion corresponds to the idea that the scientific community is 
successful in case it reaches a consensus on the objectively best theory. This 
approach has commonly been employed in ABMs of science, such as Zoll-
man’s and Grim’s ones mentioned above. Nevertheless, this criterion does not 
reflect the view of philosophers of science who endorse a pluralist view on 
scientific inquiry. According to scientific pluralism, a parallel existence of 
rivaling scientific theories is considered epistemically and heuristically benefi-
cial for the goals of the scientific community (e.g. Longino 2002; Kitcher 2011; 
Chang 2012). Hence, from a pluralist perspective, a primary epistemic goal is 
not the convergence of all scientists onto the same theory (in fact, some even 
consider it undesirable), but rather to assure that no fruitful theory has been 
prematurely abandoned. In our model this is represented as a test for whether 
the best theory is among the most actively investigated ones. 
3.2  Results 
In what follows we present the most significant results of our simulations. 
                                                             
12 For example, an undefended attack from theory Ti to theory Tk can be understood as a 
situation in which Ti has a hypothesis that explains a phenomenon more successfully than a 
corresponding hypothesis in Tk. 
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Information Sharing among Reliable Agents 
For smaller groups of reliable agents (up to 20) the impact of information shar-
ing is rather small (Figures 4 and 5). From 30 agents on, we observe a positive 
impact of an increase in information sharing on the successful convergence as 
well as on the pluralist kind of success, in case of both landscapes. In contrast, 
the negative effect on time steps needed is minimal (Figure 6).13 If we impose a 
high communication cost of 3 rounds (instead of the standard cost of 1 round), 
then if agents communicate less (with probability 0.3), they reach the end of 
the run quicker than if they communicate more (with probability 1). As ex-
pected, the effect is reversed in case communication has no cost (see Figure 7). 
Figure 4: Monist Success of Reliable Agents 
 
Monist success of reliable agents, with different probabilities of information sharing. Each data 
point is generated on the basis of 10.000 runs. The same holds for the other plots below. 
 
                                                             
13 While Figures 6, 7, and 10 concern the monist criterion, the results were in all cases similar 
for the pluralist criterion. 
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Figure 5: Pluralist Success of Reliable Agents 
 
Figure 6: Time Steps Needed for Successful Runs (Monist Criterion) with 
Reliable Agents 
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Figure 7: Time Steps Needed for Successful Runs (Monist Criterion) with 
Reliable Agents and Different Communication Costs 
 
Information Sharing Among Deceptive Agents 
While for smaller groups of deceptive agents a higher degree of information 
sharing has a relatively small impact, we notice positive effects in cases of 
larger communities (Figure 8), without slowdowns (Figure 10). In case of the 
pluralist criterion of success, different degrees of information sharing lead to 
similar degrees of success (Figure 9). 
Reliable vs. Deceptive Agents 
If we compare the groups with same degrees of information sharing, reliable 
agents tend to be clearly more successful than the deceptive ones, while being 
only slightly slower. 
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Figure 8: Monist Success of Deceptive Agents 
 
Figure 9: Pluralist Success of Deceptive Agents 
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Figure 10: Time Steps Needed for Successful Runs (Monist Criterion) with 
Deceptive Agents 
 
Efficiency of Agents on Two Landscapes 
Landscape A tends to be explored more successfully than landscape B, while 
the time steps needed remain similar. This holds for both reliable and deceptive 
agents. 
Size of the Scientific Community 
Which size of the scientific community is optimal depends on the notion of 
success we choose (i.e. the monist or the pluralist one). With the monist criteri-
on larger populations of 70 and 100 agents are outperformed by smaller popu-
lations (with an optimum around 20 and 30). A possible explanation is that 
with larger sized populations information circulates less among research 
groups,14 which may prevent them from reaching consensus, i.e. from converg-
                                                             
14 Since the size of the research groups is not proportional to the population size, the commu-
nication network on “Fridays" will with larger populations be less dense than with smaller 
populations. The above explanation is confirmed by the results in Borg et al. (2017), where 
we present a variant of the model in which the communication across the population is 
proportional to its size: larger populations in this variant of the model are more successful 
than smaller populations, in case they are highly connected. 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  301 
ing onto one theory. In contrast, the increase in the population size tends to be 
beneficial with respect to the pluralist criterion of success.  
4.  Discussion 
In this section we will first analyze the results presented in the previous section 
and compare them with findings obtained by other ABMs of science. We will 
then turn to a critical analysis of some idealizations present in our model. 
Comparison of Our Results with Other ABMs of Science 
Let us start from our two landscapes and the implications of their differences 
on the behavior of agents. The fact that agents are more successful on land-
scape A than on landscape B indicates that landscape B represents an inquiry 
that is more difficult than the one represented by landscape A. This is not sur-
prising: while A corresponds to a scenario in which the best theory is objective-
ly much better than either of its two rivals, both of which are similarly weak, B 
corresponds to a scenario in which one of the rivals of the best theory is very 
weak, while another is comparatively stronger (see Figure 3). Hence, in the 
latter case, it is more difficult to determine which theory is objectively the best 
one.15 
In case of both landscapes our highest degree of information sharing – 
which corresponds to the situation in which each scientist shares information 
with a scientist from another collaborative group once a week – is epistemically 
beneficial. Note that this especially holds for landscape B, that is, in the context 
of a difficult inquiry. This result contrasts with conclusions drawn from other 
ABMs of scientific interaction (Zollman 2007, 2010; Grim, 2009; Grim et al. 
2013). In particular, we have observed no “Zollman effect” – namely, the posi-
tive difference between successful convergence in a network with a low degree 
of information sharing versus a network with a high degree of information 
sharing (see Rosenstock et al. 2016) (see Figure 4). Does this also mean that 
                                                             
15 In terms of concrete historical examples, the latter case could be compared with the re-
search on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 
20th century. The objectively weakest theory corresponds to the 19th century view that fac-
tors such as “Old age, privation, fatigue, mental anxiety, and intemperance” are the main 
causes of PUD (Grob 2003). Two much stronger theories, which were the 20th century dom-
inant rivals were based, respectively, on the ‘bacterial hypothesis,’ according to which bac-
teria are the main etiological agent, and the ‘acidity hypothesis,’ according to which exces-
sive secretion of stomach acid causes the ulcer. While the weakest theory was rejected as 
insufficiently substantiated early on, the bacterial hypothesis was prematurely abandoned in 
the mid-20th century, only to be revived in the 1980s with Warren and Marshall’s discovery 
of Helicobacter pylori, the major cause of PUD (Šešelja and Straßer 2014). 
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our results challenge the latter? In order to answer this question, we should first 
clarify the differences between our respective models. 
First of all, we have to be careful when comparing the structure of social 
networks between our models. On the one hand, in Zollman’s and Grim’s mod-
els agents are connected in one network, throughout which information (gradu-
ally) spreads, from one agent to another. In contrast, our model employs two 
types of networks: small collaborative ones, which are complete in the sense 
that each agent shares information with every other agent, and communal ones, 
which are every time generated in a random ad-hoc way, in the sense that 
whether an agent shares information is determined probabilistically and with 
whom she shares it is random. In addition, within communal networks agents 
share only recently acquired information concerning their current theory. As a 
consequence, in our communal networks not all information necessarily 
spreads throughout the entire community. Moreover, the highest degree of 
information sharing in our model is lower than Zollman’s and Grim’s complete 
networks (where each agent shares information with every other agent). 
Nevertheless, under the assumption that the intended target phenomenon in 
our approach as well as in these ABMs is actual scientific interaction, our find-
ings indeed pose a challenge to the contrary results by the latter. Since, as we 
argue below, there is no reason to assume that any of the above mentioned 
ABMs represent scientific interaction more adequately than our ABM does, our 
results show that the findings of the latter are not robust under different as-
sumptions and idealizations underlying the models. Moreover, this leaves the 
question – whether each of these ABMs represents a specific type of actual 
scientific inquiry, or just a logical possibility not representative of any real 
world phenomena – open for future research. In fact, one may expect that 
scientific inquiry is a diversified target phenomenon and that ultimately, the 
assumptions underlying some models fit some types of scientific inquiry better 
than others, and that one model may not fit them all. In this case, and once the 
intended target domains of the respective models have been rendered more 
precisely, we may be able to avoid the interpretation according to which the 
diverging results obtained by them are challenging each other or undermining 
each other’s robustness. 
Let us now highlight the features of our model that allow for a more ade-
quate representation of scientific inquiry than this has so far been done with 
ABMs of science.16 First of all, our model addresses idealizing assumptions 
identified in other ABMs (see Section 1), namely (i) the inadequate representa-
tion of heuristic behavior, as well as (ii) the inadequate representation of in-
                                                             
16 Note that these features do not imply that the results of more idealized models are neces-
sarily less informative, less explanatory, or less reliable. We only wish to show that our mod-
el can be used to examine whether idealizations underlying other models lead to results 
that are not robust under less idealized circumstances. 
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formation flow among scientists. Regarding (i), scientists in our model are 
equipped with certain prospective considerations, explicated in Section 2.2. In 
the current version of the model, such prospective considerations play a role in 
methods that guide agents in their inquiry. In particular, if an agent discovers 
an attack on her current argument, she tries to find a defense for it. Regarding 
(ii), the notion of information flow is in contrast to many other ABMs of sci-
ence not just a simple update of information. Instead, exchange of information 
is represented as argumentative, which means that received information is 
critically assessed. Hence, when an agent receives new information regarding a 
discovered argument, she will assess it as acceptable (in case it can be defended 
in view of her knowledge base) or as unacceptable (in case it cannot be defend-
ed in view of her knowledge base). 
Finally, our model incorporates the fact that receiving information (such as 
reading articles by other scientists) costs time. 
Idealizations Present in Our ABM 
In spite of all the above mentioned features, our ABM is still based on a num-
ber of idealizations, the impact of which should be examined in future research. 
First, heuristics of agents are highly simplified, including their search for de-
fense in view of discovered attacks. Even though agents may recognize a de-
fense in case it is located in their surroundings (i.e. in one of the child-
arguments of the given attacked argument, which an agent currently explores), 
a defense may be present at an entirely different branch of the tree. It is not 
surprising then that we noticed hardly any effect of the heuristic behavior in 
our runs when comparing them to runs without heuristic behavior. Equipping 
agents with more adequate tools and thus representing a scientist as having 
methods for finding solutions for the current anomalies of the theory, is another 
task for future research.17 It also remains a task for a future version of the mod-
el to incorporate such features into the evaluations performed by agents in view 
of which they can judge how promising their theory is. Such an assessment 
would more aptly capture heuristic appraisal, which informs scientists how 
worthy of pursuit different theories are, rather than how confirmed (or defensi-
ble) they are in view of the available evidence. 
Second, anomalies of a given theory are currently represented solely as at-
tacks from one of the rivaling theories. An improved version of the model 
should allow for anomalies to be represented also as counter-evidence that is 
independent from those other theories. To this end, we will include a more 
direct representation of evidence and counter-evidence in a future version of 
the model. 
                                                             
17 For a step further in this direction see Borg et al. (2017). 
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Third, which parameter settings for building landscapes in our model are 
representative of specific types of scientific controversies is an open question. 
While we have tried to represent different situations of a scientific inquiry with 
our two landscapes, more work needs to be done to allow for an empirical 
calibration of our model.18 
Fourth, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the calculation of the degree of defen-
sibility of a theory is based on the number of defensible arguments of that 
theory: if it turns out that another theory has more defensible arguments (above 
a relative threshold), after some deliberation the agent jumps to that theory. 
This means that our agents represent scientists who are easily impressed by 
new discoveries, that is, by hypotheses that in view of new results seem to be 
corroborated. Hence, if a rivaling theory appears to have more such hypotheses, 
our scientists will switch to pursuing it, although later studies may reveal that 
some of those hypotheses have turned out to be wrong. Note that changing the 
way agents evaluate theories may have a strong impact on our current results. 
For instance, our agents could be modeled as scientists who never abandon 
their current theory unless a number of its undefended arguments (i.e. hypothe-
ses) passes a certain relative threshold, in comparison to the rivaling theories. 
Such agents wouldn’t easily get misled by early apparent successes of a rival-
ing theory, but they could be misled by early apparent problems in their own or 
in one of the rivaling theories. Investigating the impact of different types of 
evaluations underlying decisions of scientists for which theory they are to 
pursue remains a task for future research. 
In view of these remarks, it is important to interpret the results of our runs 
cautiously when it comes to their relevance for actual scientific practice. The 
primary function of our model in its current state is, on the one hand, to provide 
the basis for testing the robustness of the results obtained by other ABMs tack-
ling similar questions, in order to determine whether they provide a robust 
property. A robust property is, according to Weisberg “a dynamic or static 
property common to many models making different idealizing assumptions” 
(2006, 736), and a necessary step in the robustness analysis of a set of models 
representing a given target phenomenon.19 On the other hand, the aim of our 
ABM is to serve a heuristic purpose of constructing more informative models 
of scientific interaction (Reutlinger et al. 2016). The modular nature of our 
                                                             
18 For the importance of empirically calibrating simulations of this kind see Martini and Pinto 
(2016). 
19  As Weisberg writes: “During this stage it is important to collect a sufficiently diverse set of 
models so that the discovery of a robust property does not depend in an arbitrary way on 
the set of models analyzed” (2006, 737). Given that the assumptions underlying our model 
are quite different from those underlying Zollman’s or Grim’s models, we find it suitable for 
this purpose. 
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model together with its specific design features makes it a fruitful basis for 
further improvements, which can provide insights into real world phenomena.20 
5.  Conclusion and Outlook 
In this paper we have presented an ABM of scientific inquiry which makes use 
of abstract argumentation, aiming to model the argumentative nature of scien-
tific inquiry. The presented version of our model is designed to tackle the ques-
tion how different degrees of information flow among scientists affects the 
efficiency of their knowledge acquisition. Our results suggest that an increased 
information sharing tends to be epistemically beneficial, and that this holds for 
both, the conditions of easier inquiry and the conditions of a more difficult one, 
where determining which of the rivaling theories is the best one is harder. 
While we have argued that our model allows for a de-idealization of some 
important assumptions underlying scientific inquiry in comparison to the pre-
vious ABMs of science, we have also emphasized a number of currently em-
ployed idealizations, the impact of which remains to be investigated in future 
research. We will conclude the paper by showing the fruitfulness of our ABM 
for the investigation of related questions concerning social aspects of scientific 
inquiry. 
First, our model can be enhanced with different types of research behavior, 
such as “mavericks” and “followers,” introduced in Weisberg and Muldoon 
(2009) (see also Fernández Pinto and Fernández Pinto 2018 in this issue). Next, 
the model can be enhanced with other aspects of scientific inquiry, such as an 
explanatory relation and a set of explananda (Šešelja and Straßer 2013). This 
would allow for an investigation of different evaluative procedures which 
agents perform when selecting their preferred theory (e.g. in addition to the 
degree of defensibility, agents can take into account how much their current 
theory explains, or how well it is supported by evidence). Furthermore, a num-
ber of enhancements available from the literature on abstract argumentation, 
such as probabilistic semantics (Thimm 2012), values (Bench-Capon 2002), 
etc. can be introduced in future versions of our ABM. 
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